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I. "Je ne peux pas continuer, je vais continuer": Beckett After 
The Unnamable 
"Le grand remède aux misères de ce monde, c'est l'absorption dans l'instant 
présent." —Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
Beckett published LTnnommable in 1953. This last book of the trilogy was 
also Beckett's last so-called "novel." Three years later, in an interview with Israel 
Schenker, Beckett explained the move away from novel writing as inevitable after 
the trilogy. After writing texts in which there was "no ' I , ' no 'have,' no 'being,'" 
there was, as Beckett said, truly "no way to go on.'" Despite this claim, Beckett, 
like the ever-running discourse of The Unnamable, did indeed "go on." During the 
same period in which Beckett stopped writing novels, he began writing extensively 
for the theatre. Since then, many critics—among them William Worthen, Sidney 
Homan, and Michael Robinson—^ have come to believe that the "coincidence" of 
Beckett's last novel with his increased interest in the theatre was no coincidence at 
all; that Beckett's turn to the stage represented a "natural" progression in his career, 
"the only direction in which a development was possible."^ Having just completed 
several novels increasingly dominated by a sense of absence—the absence of "I ," 
of "have" and so on—Beckett, it is often suggested, turned to the stage in search of 
what had become increasingly elusive in his novels: "presence." 
There is some evidence to support the claim that Beckett himself viewed his 
work after L'Innommable as indicative of a general turn from the inherent "lack" 
of the novel towards the "presence" of the theatre. Apart from En Attendant Godot, 
which was published in French in 1952, the majority of Beckett's dramatic texts 
were indeed composed only after the trilogy had been completed. Perhaps more 
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striking, as Steven Connor notes,"^ the suggestion that Beckett turned to the theatre 
in search of a "presence" not found in the novel was actually made first by Beckett 
himself In Michael Haerdter's Materialen zu Bechens Endspiel, Beckett states: 
"Theater is fur mich zunächst eine Erholung von der Arbeit am Roman"^ ("Theatre 
is for me a relief/rest from the work of the novel."). Beckett goes on to explain that 
this is not because he thought it easier to write theatrical texts than novels, but 
rather because the theatrical performance fulfills a need that novel writing does 
not: "Man hat es mit einem bestimmten Raum zu tun und mit Menschen in diesem 
Raum" ("[AU] human beings have a need for space, but also to share that space 
with other human beings.").^ Although it might seem as if Beckett is articulating a 
philosophical declaration about the nature of presence and being in that his statement 
is cleariy a generalization ("All humans . . . ") , there is little in the interview to 
justify such a reading. Instead, it appears that Beckett is expressing a desire for a 
rather commonplace theorization of the theatre as the privileged space of moving, 
possibly speaking, bodies on stage—as the space of group presence. In other words, 
a wish to participate in a rather commonplace identification of the theatre as the 
privileged space of group presence. After immersing himself in the extreme isolation 
and claustrophobia associated with the prose of the trilogy,^ Beckett—it seems 
from his statement—simply found relief in the physical presence of bodies on 
stage. 
II. "Being There:" Presence and the Body 
The designation of the theatre as the space in which "metaphysical plenitude"^ 
reigns is a common identification in Western thought. The assumption is that the 
theatre permits—and in the case of traditional theatre, even demands—the presence 
of actual moving, speaking bodies on stage. That the theater is also simultaneously 
a space of non-presence in that the people on stage are acting and the events 
portrayed are not "real" goes without saying. However, the actors are nonetheless 
still physically present on stage and actions are performed on that stage and in the 
present time of the production. Thus, regardless of the fact that what is being 
presented is simply "pretend," the audience experiences the production in a way 
that is more immediately assessable to the senses than its more cerebral prose 
counterpart. The determination of the theatre as the privileged space of presence 
for such reasons, of course, amounts to the simple—even simplistic—equating of 
presence" with "being." This is the ostensible reason underlying the primacy of 
lerformance that was even more in vogue in experimental theatre of the late 1960s 
and 70s: performance is privileged because what takes place in the staging of a 
text appears to be nothing less than a miracle. To stage a theatrical text, to put it 
physically before an audience, is to seemingly embody it or resurrect it before that 
Spring 2004 23 
audience. In this not-so-distant relative of Berkeley's "Esse estpercipi," acting out 
a written text on stage is to bestow upon it flesh and, therefore, life. 
In "Notes from the Underground: Waiting for Godot and Endgame,'' Herbert 
Blau suggests an unspoken dialogue between Beckett and Antoine Artaud, perhaps 
the most well known French playwright to have attempted both to access and exploit 
a supposed natural presence of the theatre. In fact, Blau describes Beckett's Endgame 
as more than simply evocative of Artaud's theater, but rather as Artaud's theater. 
Here, he claims, "We are in Artaud's Theater of Cruelty, at the dark root of the 
scream, the unbearably h u m a n e . B e f o r e examining the extent to which this 
statement about the correspondence between the work of these two playwrights is 
legitimate, it is necessary to first recall the theoretical basis of Artaud's concept of 
the theater. In "Produc t ion and Metaphys ics , " Artaud characterizes his 
conceptualization of a "fully present theatre" as a "theatre of cruelty." By naming 
it thus, Artaud was not advocating subjecting the audience to depictions of sadistic 
or "cruel" actions on stage—^not necessarily, in any case. Artaud was more concemed 
with the relationship between the spectators and the production. Dramatic works 
should permeate the audience like a "full," "physical" "shock" to the senses, so 
that the spectators would be permitted to experience the "presence" of the theatre 
in an extremely intimate, visceral way. Artaud argues that if one allows the stage to 
"speak its own concrete language," the audience will be able to experience even 
the language of the production in a "completely tangible manner." Yet, the stage 
can "speak its own . . . language" and thus can achieve the fullness of presence 
only if it is independent of the "tyranny of the text"'° and thus free from re-
presenta t ion . Remin i scen t of Jean-Jacques Rousseau ' s ideal ized, non-
representational theatre, Artaud's Theater of Cruelty, Derrida insists, is not a 
representation at all, which is in part what makes it impossible to achieve: "It is 
life itself, in the extent to which life is unrepresentable."^^ 
Probably the most prominent critic to have ever suggested that Beckett's theatre 
also aims to underscore a sheer, physical "presence"—albeit in a less extreme 
fashion than in Artaud's theorizations—is writer Alain Robbe-Grillet. Robbe-Grillet 
claims that by highlighting physical presence, Beckett's plays stage the very essence 
of the theatre. In his article, "Samuel Beckett, ou la présence sur la scène," Robbe-
Grillet suggests that by stressing the essence of the theatre, Beckett is also 
(re)presenting the "essence" of the human condition. As his primary example, 
Robbe-Grillet focuses on Beckett 's En Attendant Godot which he views as 
representative of the Heideggerean conceptualization of the human condition as 
"Dasein," or "being-there." With almost no personal background and with seemingly 
nothing to do but wait, Godot's Vladimir and Estragon appear to be simply and 
"irremediably present." Though they may have little in common with anyone we 
might know in "real" life, they do seem to share at least one thing with the human 
condition; the "primary quality" of being there. 
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Four years after the publication of Robbe-Grillet's Pour un nouveau roman, 
Jacques Derrida also examines the association of being and presence in philosophy, 
but with decidedly more suspicion than Robbe-Grillet. For Derrida, the association 
of being with presence carries with it greater consequences then that of simply 
establishing a link between so-called pure presence and the human body—which 
is, for Derrida, what makes this association particularly dangerous. Once established, 
this determinat ion al lows for the poss ibi l i ty of inaugura t ing a set of 
subdeterminations. Among them, Derrida lists "présence de la chose au regard 
comme eidos, présence comme substance/essence/existence (ousia), présence 
temporelle comme pointe (stigmè) du maintenant ou de l'instant (mm), présence à 
soi du cogito, conscience, subjectivité, co-présence de Vautre et de soi, 
inter subjectivité comme phénomène intentionnel de l'ego, etc" ("presence of the 
thing to the sight as eidos, presence as substance/essence/existence [ousia'], temporal 
presence as point [stigmè] of the now or of the moment [nun], the self-presence of 
the cogito, consciousness, subjectivity, the co-presence of the other and of the self, 
intersubjectivity as the intentional phenomenon of the ego, and so fo r th" ) .S imply 
put, once presence is linked to Being, a surplus of general principles of metaphysics 
can henceforth be posited, and all notions that complicate these principles can be 
disregarded. The moment presence is determined as "being," we become 
anesthetized to anything that disrupts the metaphysical assumptions that are bom 
of this association. For Derrida, the coupling of being and presence is nothing less 
than "Vether de la métaphysique, "^"^ 
III. "Being? Where?" The Absence of Presence in Beckett's Theatre 
The question remains as to whether Beckett's theatre intends to exploit a "pure 
presence" or whether it instead means to expose it as an illusion. In order to answer 
this question, several points must be taken into consideration. First, no play that 
derives from a text can logically be considered to represent "pure presence," since 
it relies on something prior to itself for its existence. In order for presence to be 
"pure"—^by definition—it cannot be tainted by anything that is not itself—in other 
words, it must be its own origin and end. It goes without saying that Beckett's 
staged plays are all the product of a text. Secondly, much of what appears to be 
indicative of pure presence in his work is the result of detailed stage directions in 
the script. For example, if the director remains tme to the text, as directors such as 
Roger Blin and Alan Schneider often did,'^ every pause a character makes on stage 
can be found already recorded in the script. In some plays, such as Happy Days, 
there are hundreds of pauses; all of which are scripted: 
. . . I have the whole—(Pause. Puzzled.) Them? (Pause) Or it? 
(Pause.) Bmsh and comb it? (Pause.) Sounds improper somehow. 
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{Pause . . . ) What would you say, Willie? {Pause . . . ) What 
would you say, Willie, speaking of your hair, them or it? {Pause.) 
The hair on your head, I mean. {Pause . . . ) The hair on your 
head, Willie, what would you say speaking of the hair on your 
head, them or it? {Long pause.). 
In the case of Footfalls, even the steps taken are accounted for in the stage directions: 
Pacing: starting with right foot (r), from right (r) to left (L), with 
left foot (1) ft-om L to R. Turn: rightabout at L, leftabout at R. 
Steps: clearly audible rhythmic tread. 
Here, the stage directions are later brought to the spectator's attention, for the 
steps are then measured and voiced by the characters themselves: 
One two three four five six seven eight nine wheel one two three 
four five six seven eight nine wheel.^'^ 
Even where the pure presence seems to be, if not to be presented, at least re­
presented in Beckett's theatre, it is never truly "pure." "Presence" is exposed in his 
work to be contaminated by, even produced by, repetition. Vivian Mercier has 
called En Attendant Godot a "theoretical impossibility," for it is a play in which 
not only ""nothing happens,'"^—^which would highlight the "presence" and "present" 
of the moment—^but rather in which nothing happens "Av/cг."'^ Clearly, Mercier 
does not mean to say that literally nothing at all happens in the play. That actions 
are performed, speech is articulated, is indisputable. Vladimir and Estragon wait 
on a road by one leafless tree for the coming of Godot.They talk to pass the time, 
meet Pozzo and Lucky, watch the former coerce the latter into performing a variety 
of commands, and meet a little boy who informs them that Godot is busy and will 
instead come tomorrow. But as Ruby Cohn notes and the title of the play suggests, 
the reason that some readers and critics have labeled Godot as a play "about 
nothing," is because the most evident "action" of this play is not an action per se 
but rather a state—^that of w a i t i n g : " . . . they keep their appointment and they wait. 
Night after night, they keep their appointment, and they wait." Echoing Robbe-
Grillet, Cohn adds that Godofs ''thereness unrolls before our perceptions." Cohn 
maintains that there is in fact actually as much "doing" as being in Godot, but the 
doing and being are "constantly threatened by Nothing."^^ Both Cohn and Martin 
Esslin insist that the apparent stasis in a play like Godot might even be better 
described as less a study on Nothingness than an amplification of the dramatic 
form, of a "maximal intensification of the tensions that make conventional plays 
dramatic."^' 
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Whatever the particular interpretation of the "events" of Godot, the virtual 
lack of so-called meaningful action that is described by Cohn as frequently having 
an "improvisational quality,"^^ accompanied by a focus on the dramatic form, seems 
an attempt on the part of the playwright to render the notion of presence—^presence 
of being and present in time—immediately perceptible to the audience. Even Cohn 
has referred at one time to Godot, Endgame, and Krapp's Last Tape, as plays that 
offer not only "endless continua" but also "different images of an unending 
present."^^ However, there is an equal emphasis on repetition in Beckett's plays 
that complicates such a notion. Besides the innumerable words and phrases that 
are repeated verbatim in Godot, Act Two is so strikingly similar to Act One that it 
reads as a virtual duplication of all that preceded it. Admittedly, the tree now has 
leaves on it, signaling the passage of time from the first to the second act, and 
Pozzo and Lucky's relationship takes on a decidedly less vaudevillesque and more 
sadistic tone. Yet the symmetry between the two acts remains startling: Vladimir 
and Estragón find themselves again on the road, by a tree, in the company of 
Pozzo and Lucky, later of the little boy who informs them again about Godot's 
plans, and all the while they wait. Cohn extends the list of repetitive gestures: "In 
both acts they comment on their reunion, they complain of their misery, they seek 
escape into games, they are frightened by offstage menace, they try to remember a 
past, they stammer a hope for a future, they utter doubts about time, place, and 
language, they wait for Godot."^"^ Or as Mercier writes, nothing happens twice. 
Far from affirming a sense of a pure presence, the reprisals of these seemingly 
innocuous and uneventful actions suggest instead the theoretical impossibility of 
such purity. Steven Connor explains this in Heideggerian terms. At the beginning 
of the second act, the audience witnesses what seems to be a near repetition of the 
first act. Yet, as Connor argues, we are only cognizant of the return of Vladimir 
and Estragon's "being-back (on stage)-again," or even their "still-being-there" at 
the beginning of the second Act "because of our awareness of the break that has 
taken place between the first two Acts." The break or "absence" that marks the 
first Act as, at once, the same as and different from the second Act, is enough to 
allow the "shadow of absence or non-being to fall across the fullness and simplicity 
of Dasein."^^ 
Herbert Blau contends that no modem drama is "more sensitively aware of 
the presence of an audience or its absence"^^ than Beckett's Godot. I would suggest 
that Godot is not an exception. I would also add, like Connor, that this sensitivity 
extends far beyond the level of the audience. Beckettien presence depends upon 
absence, just as absence in his work relies on presence for the perception of its 
very existence. Beckett offers his audience an absence which, in the words of 
Enoch Brater, takes on "a hovering presence."^'^ In Oh les beaux jours we are only 
cognizant of Winnie's "present" or her condition of "still-being-there"—buried in 
the mound of dirt, rattling on about the objects in her purse—^because of the absence 
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involved in the change in Acts. Presence in this play, as well as in Godot—a play 
in which the title "character" himself is never "present"—can only be perceived 
by way of its contamination by something "other" than itself. 
Derrida argues that any desire for a pure presence, such as that invested in 
Artaud's "theatre of cruelty," is destined to remain unfulfilled precisely because 
there is no such thing as "pure" presence to begin with: "Presence, in order to be 
presence and self-presence, has always already begun to represent itself, has always 
already been penetrated." Thus, the extent to which Artaud wanted to save the 
"purity" of presence untainted by "interior difference" and repetition, is the extent 
to which he simultaneously "desired the impossibility of the theatre." Derrida is 
quick, however, to note that Artaud knew this "better than any other." He knew 
that the theater of cruelty would always be "the inaccessible limit of a representation 
which is not repetition, of a re-presentation which is full presence, which does not 
carry its double within itself as its death, of a present which does not repeat itself, 
that is, of a present outside time, a non-present."^^ 
The appearance of a "pure present," what Vincent Descombes refers to as the 
Husserlian ''présent vivant'" is just that: appearance. It is an illusion constructed in 
order to support phenomenological and metaphysical thought; in particular, the 
idea that one can distinguish between an original entity and one that is derived. In 
order to effect a deconstruction of this so-called "husserlian principle of principles," 
Derrida counters it with his own "principle of non-principles."^^ Here, one can 
only conceive of a present or presence either immediately before or immediately 
after it has happened. The present can only be conceived of as "present" belatedly, 
and thus any present that does not "carry its double within itself as its death," is a 
present outside of t ime." "The "present" is always already "non-present." As 
Descombes explains it, this belated present is thus even responsible for producing 
history: "// y a histoire, parce que dès l'origine, le présent est comme en retard sur 
lui-même." ("There is only history, because, from the origin onwards, the present 
is, so to speak, always delayed with regard to itself').^^ Whether it is in relation to 
the present time or the presence of the physical body, "pure presence" is no more 
than a fantasy. It cannot be re-presented on stage—not by Artaud, nor by Beckett— 
because "pure" presence does not exist as such. 
IV. "Writing is Dirty, Speech is Clean:" The Moralization of Speech and 
Presence 
If the theatre can be perceived as the space of "pure presence" because it 
allows spectators to witness the presence of physical bodies on stage acting out a 
text in the present time of the production, it is no less possible to make this same 
connection between presence and the speech act in the theatre.The stage permits 
for the possibility of the articulation and reception of speech, which has historically 
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been associated with presence. Richard Begam argues that this correlation between 
the speech act and presence stems from the logocentristic perception of the body 
as the original intentional context of the "idea." When one verbally articulates a 
message in the presence of and in the present time of another person, there is less 
chance of the message being misinterpreted than if the message had first been 
written and read at a later time. The implication, then, is that the body, as the 
source of the verbal message, is the site at which the "truth" of a message originates.^ ^  
There is, of course, nothing "original" in characterizing the speech act as 
representative of presence and the written word as inhabited by absence. 
Philosophers from Plato to Malebranche to Descartes to Leibnitz to Condillac to 
Rousseau, and so on, have long made this claim. They argue that writing depends 
on absence for its very being, since it would not be "present" at all if it were not 
needed to account for some "originary absence." 
In Of Grammatology, Derrida interrogates the origins of such originary absence 
linked to the written word. Readers who are familiar with Derrida's work will 
certainly need no introduction to such a canonical text as Grammatology. However, 
an understanding of the origins of the speech/writing hierarchy is essential in the 
context of this examination of presence and speech in Beckett's work.The 
elucidation of certain aspects of this text will thus prove of use to those readers for 
whom his work is not as well known. In "From/Of the Supplement to the Source," 
Derrida explains the inauguration of the association of writing with absence by 
stating that: 
. . . c 'est au moment où la distance sociale... s'accroît jusqu 'à 
devenir absence, que l'écriture devient nécessaire.... Quand le 
champ de la société s'étend au point de l'absence, de l'invisible, 
de l'inaudible, de l'immémorable, quand la communauté locale 
est disloquée au point que les individus ne s'apparaissent 
plus les uns aux autres, deviennent sujets d'être imperceptibles, 
/ 'âge de l'écriture commence. 
. . . it is at the moment that the social d is tance. . . increases to the 
point of becoming absence, that writing becomes necessary. . . . 
When the field of society extends to the point of absence, of the 
invisible, the inaudible, and the immemorable, when the local 
community is dislocated to the point where individuals no longer 
appear to one another, become capable of being imperceptible, 
the age of writing begins.^^ 
While communication in the way of gestures or speech is considered "fiilly present" 
and even "originary"^^ because it is intended to be used in the presence of the 
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destinator, writing is meant to signify in the absence of both the destinator and the 
locuteur. 
One might imagine that writing would then at least be privileged as an 
invaluable form of communication in absentia. This has not, however, been the 
case in Western thought. Instead, writing has been regarded not only as the weaker 
counterpart of speech, but even as a degenerative form of communication, fraught 
with risk and a potential for perversity—only to be used when absolutely necessary, 
and only in the "absence" of speech. Derrida claims that this has always been the 
status of writing in the history of metaphysics: it is but "a debased, lateralized, 
repressed, displaced theme. . ." The celebrated linguist Ferdinand de Saussure 
offers one reason for the secondary status of writing in western thought. While the 
oral sign is the sign of the "inner meaning" of the original thing or idea, the graphic 
sign is but a sign of the oral sign, and as such it is one additional step removed 
from the original idea. Thus, although both speech and writing are supplements for 
some original entity, writing is, as Derrida expresses it, "the supplement par 
excellence" because it "marks the point where the supplement proposes i tself not 
simply as a supplement, but as a "supplement of supplement, sign of sign, taking 
the place of a speech already significant." Writing "marks the place of the initial 
doubling." 
Derrida notes however that supplementarity is more often than not characterized 
as being far from innocuous. He argues that writing is not thought of as a simple 
supplement to speech, but rather as "'the dangerous supplement."^^ There are several 
reasons for this designation. The practical explanation states that if a person is not 
present when what he has written is read, he cannot be sure that the message has 
been interpreted as it was intended. To commit one's thoughts to writing, then, is 
to put one's message in danger of being misunderstood; it is to raArthe "truth" of 
the original utterance. Every instance of writing accuses the absence of this original 
context and so accuses the absence of the "truth" of the original context. Thus, 
Derrida insists that "the history of truth," of "the truth of truth," has always been 
the "debasement of writing."^^ 
Derrida argues that while there are "practical" reasons why writing has been 
traditionally viewed as less desirable than speech—why it is indeed characterized 
as perilous in comparison—the real reason for the secondary status of writing is 
ultimately mythic and moral. The sign, Derrida claims, "is always a sign of the 
Fall." Any absence "always relates to distancing from God."^^ For someone like 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau about whom Derrida writes, this translates to a fall into 
depravity. The "noble savage" of the "Discourse on the Origin of Inequality" loses 
his nobility and innocence with the advent of civilization, representation, and, in 
particular, writing. Any representation clumsily and excessively conceals or "masks" 
something "natural," and in so doing, renders that original and "natural" thing 
"civilized," that is to say, frightening, even perverse. This is in fact the argument 
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Rousseau employs in his critique of the theatre in "Letter to M. d'Alembert." 
Rousseau explains that one must allow "a lively and frolicsome youth" to partake 
of innocent and "natural" pleasures such as public gatherings in "open air"— 
festivals "without object. . . without sacrifice . . . without expense . . . and above 
all without masks." If, he warns, we do not allow them such innocent pleasures, 
they invariably "substitut[e] more dangerous ones . . . ." One way or another, a 
choice will be made; children will choose to take part in activities that take place 
out in open, public spaces, or in private, concealed spaces. For Rousseau, the 
appropriate decision is quite "clean" While innocent joys "evaporate in the full 
light of day," vice "is a friend of shadows." For Derrida, the underlying message 
of Rousseau's argument against concealment is ironically just as transparent. Any 
"condemnation of masks," he argues, is also "an ambiguous condemnation" of 
writing.^^ 
V. "Speaking Is Dirty, Writing is Clean:" Revisiting the Speech/Writing 
Polarity 
In a television interview with Claire Pamet, Gilles Deleuze uttered the now 
(in)famous phrase with which he will perhaps forever be associated: "Speaking is 
dirty, writing is clean" {"parler, c'est sale, écrire, c'est propre"). Notwithstanding 
the evident incongruity of actually speaking such an utterance, Deleuze's aim was 
to launch a critique against all so-called intellectuals who waste their time speaking 
instead of thinking, participating in opportunities for "babble," otherwise named 
"colloquia," rather than carefully organizing and writing down their thoughts. 
However, in uttering the phrase, "Speaking is dirty, writing is clean," Deleuze also 
manages to unsettle the age-old speech/writing hierarchy by turning it on its head. 
Here, it is speech—not writing—^that is not only inadequate but even perverse or 
"dirty." 
In his essay "La Différance" in Marges de la philosophie Derrida also sets out 
to undermine these age-old assumptions about speech and writing by demonstrating 
the inability of speech to account for meaning or for the intent of the speaker. The 
example he employs is the word "différance,'' which, depending on whether it is 
spelled with an "a" ("-ance") or an "e" ("-ence"), could mean either "to differ" or 
"to defer." What makes this word particularly important for his argument is that 
the difference between the two words—"différance"' or "différence"—cannot be 
heard. It can only be seen. The difference is therefore solely graphic. Thus, when 
uttering these words in a speech—which Derrida does, as "La Différance" was 
originally delivered as a speech—there is no way of knowing which meaning is 
being referred to: "Je ne peux en effet vous faire savoir par mon discours, par ma 
parole à l'instant proféré de quelle différence je parle au moment où j'en parle." 
In speech, the "a" remains "silent, secret and discreet as a tomb" ("// demeure 
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silencieux, secret et discret comme un tombeau"). Immediately perceptible in writing 
alone, this one letter manages to effect a privileging of the written word and to 
topple the speech/writing hierarchy. As such, this seemingly insignificant "a" has 
the power to bring about the "death of a dynasty" ("la mort du dynaste").^^ 
Yet despite their common reversal of the speech/writing binary opposition, 
Deleuze and Derrida remain very different thinkers, and this difference extends 
itself to the way in which each theorizes this opposition as well. Where Deleuze 
reverses the hierarchy—which disturbs the balance of power, but still leaves the 
hierarchy intact—Derrida destabilizes the hierarchy itself by demonstrating how it 
is ultimately impossible to decide which term has more power. Simply put, perhaps 
neither speech nor writing can lay exclusive claim to presence, or for that matter, 
to absence either. 
Derrida comes to this conclusion after investigating the definition of the sign 
itself Every sign is a substitute for the thing, idea or person it represents. An oral 
sign, like its written counterpart, is but a signifier "whose signified is another 
signifier and never the thing i tself {''dont le signifié est un autre signifiant, et 
jamais 'la chose même'").^^ Regardless of whether it is graphic or oral, the sign 
can therefore never truly lay any claim to presence, because, as Derrida states: 
Le signe, dit-on couramment, se met à la place de la chose même, 
de la chose présente, ''chose " valant ici aussi bien pour le sens 
que pour le réfèrent. Le signe représente le présent en son 
absence. Il en tient lieu. Quand nous ne pouvons prendre ou 
montrer la chose, disons le présent, Vétant-présent, quand le 
présent ne se présente pas, nous signifions, nous passons par le 
détour du signe. 
The sign is usually said to be put in the place of the thing itself, 
the present thing, "thing" here standing equally for meaning or 
referent. The sign represents the present in its absence. It takes 
the place of the present. When we cannot grasp or show the thing, 
state the present, the being-present, when the present cannot be 
presented, we signify, we go through the detour of the sign.^^ 
If the sign represents a present, it can therefore only be a differed presence. All 
signs, even those belonging to speech, are conceivable "only on the basis of a 
presence that [they] defer and moving toward the differed presence that [they] aim 
to reappropriate" ("qu'à partir de la présence qu 'il diffère et en vue de la présence 
différée qu 'on vise à se réapproprier"). 
The absence of presence is not the only property speech and writing have in 
common. As a result of this lack, they also share the quality of iterability. Due to 
the potential for its message to be taken out of the particular context in which it 
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was written (i.e., it's potential for repeatability), writing has always been conceived 
of as "dead" or contaminated by absence. Speech, on the other hand, is considered 
to be solidly fixed within its original context. Thus unlike writing, which is thought 
of as nothing but the "sign of a sign," speech supposedly resists facile quotation. 
Derrida suggests, however, that the possibility of extraction and "citational grafting" 
may well constitute not only the condition of writing, but of all language: 
Tout signe, linguistique ou non linguistique, parlé ou écrit . . . 
peut être cité, mis entre guillemets; par là, il peut rompre avec 
tout contexte donné, engendrer à l'infini de nouveaux contextes, 
de façon absolument non saturable. 
Every sign, linguistic or non-linguistic, spoken or written . . . 
can be cited, put between quotation marks; thereby it can break 
with every given context, and engender infinitely new contexts 
in an absolutely nonsaturable fashion."^^ 
This possibility of being severed from its referent, "cut off from its alleged 
'production' or origin," marks every sign, even if oral, as a "grapheme;" it constitutes 
all signs in advance as writing."^^ 
Regardless of how much one would like to believe that speech is exempt from 
the constraints of writing, and is independent of writing, the facts are inescapable. 
Rousseau is the preeminent example, for though he praises the healing properties 
of presence and speech, he is obliged to concede his own dependence on writing in 
order to make these thoughts known. Plato too shows his hand in this way, for 
though the "Symposium" is presented in dialogue form, it was always, and only, a 
written work. Finally, speech in the theater is always already simultaneously present 
and represented. Speech and writing are implicated within one another, and the 
only "illusion" is that "they are two" {"qu 'ils font deux ").^ 
VI. "Play It Again, Sam:" Presence, Speech and Repetition in Beckett's 
Theatrical Productions 
Beckett's so-called "tum'"^^ to the theatre could be perceived less as a desire to 
simply be in the presence of bodies on stage as a wish to distance himself in a 
definitive manner ft-om the tyrannical drudgery of the written word. Beckett implied 
as much when telling Colin Duckworth that he began to vmte Godot "as a relaxation, 
to get away from the awful prose I was writing at that time."^^ Yet the idea that 
Beckett "turned" to the theatre and away from prose decisively in search of the 
presence of speech is problematic. While Beckett did concentrate more energy on 
writing for the stage after completing the trilogy, by no means did he give up 
writing prose altogether in order to do so. In fact, he continued to write and publish 
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a significant amount of short prose well into the 1980s. The idea that Beckett 
turned to the theatre to the exclusion of other writing—that there was some 
evolutionary "progression" from prose to the theatre—is then simply inaccurate 
and can only be explained as the result of a conspicuous blindness to at least half 
of the work he produced from the mid 1950s until his death. 
More importantly, Beckett's treatment of the speech act on stage reveals that 
he is as suspicious of its supposed natural primacy or claim to presence as he is of 
the notion of presence itself His extensive use of silence in both his plays and 
films suggests this quite readily. Act Without Words, Nacht und Träume and Quad 
are all productions—the first a play, and the other two telefilms—in which no 
words are ever uttered. No speech is present. Film, on the other hand, features one 
word, but it is a word that is meant to produce silence alone: "Shhhhh." Even the 
plays and telefilms that feature a substantial amount of dialogue manage to question 
the primacy of speech. The countless refrains uttered by characters like Vladimir 
and Estragon in En Attendant Godot, Winnie in Oh les beaux jours, and Hamm, 
Clov, Nell, and Nagg in Fin de partie, undermine any sense of originality in speech. 
In certain plays. Fin de partie, Embers, and Oh les beaux jours, for example, there 
are so many pauses incorporated into the script that they rival the words that are 
actually spoken. 
Of all of Beckett's plays the one that most calls into quesfion the link between 
speech and presence is La Dernière bande. La Dernière bande is the "story" of a 
man who, on his birthday, ritualistically takes out his tape recorder in order to 
listen to past recordings of his own voice—^recordings made on previous birthdays— 
and to tape present-day impressions of his life and state of being. Initially, thus, 
this appears to be a play about the "present," in particular, about the possibility of 
accessing the present long after the present has ceased to be. By listening to 
recordings of a past-present in the present-present, and by taping the present-present 
that is also projected as a future-present, Krapp appears to have found a way to still 
time and to live in a perpetual present. This is, however, not at all the case. While 
it would seem that a tape-recorded version of past events could capture a presence 
that writing could not (if only by bringing the actual voice of a present long since 
past into the actual present), this is not what takes place in this play. For, although 
the recorded voice of Krapp as a young man has indeed been fixed within the 
present in which it was recorded, it can enter the present-present only by virtue of 
some thing; here, a tape recorder. The supposed "immediacy" of the present of the 
tape recordings is really just a mediated-immediacy, signaling it from the start as a 
non-immediacy. In fact, even what one would normally call the "present" in this 
play—^the action of Krapp listening to and making recordings—is not a "present" 
at all. As the very first words of this play tell us, what happens on stage takes place 
on a late evening "in the ftiture." Be that as it may, this is something the spectators 
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would know only if they had previously read the text or if the director chose to 
highlight this very significant detail in the production. 
Although Krapp himself never articulates it as such, he is not ignorant of the 
effects of the passage of time.While his taped voice manages to stay fixed in the 
moment in which it was taped, he recognizes that he himself has changed 
dramatically since the taping and scarcely resembles or even remembers the "stupid 
bastard [he] took [himself] for thirty years ago."^^ The difference between the two 
versions of himself is evident in the many parts of the play when the older, more 
cantankerous Krapp attempts to interact and identify with the voice of the more 
youthful, pompous person he used to be: 
The voice! Jesus! And the aspirations! {Brief laugh in which 
Krapp joins.) And the resolutions! {Brief laugh in which Krapp 
joins.) To drink less in particular. {Brief laugh of Krapp alone.y^ 
Try as he might to correspond fully to his younger self, and thus to repeat a present 
long past, difference—in the form of time—has already entered the equation, 
rendering the retrieval of that moment impossible. 
Krapp's memory—or lack thereof—is another confirmation of this 
impossibility of ever fiilly recovering the past. Frequently, the older, less mentally 
agile Krapp has difficulty remembering aspects of what he evidently once knew so 
well. The business about "the black ball" that he wrote of in his ledger is now as 
lost to him as the not so-memorable "memorable equinox": 
Hm . . . The black ball . . . {he raises his head, stares blankly 
front. Puzzled.) Black ba l l ? . . . {Hepeers again at ledger, reads.) 
The dark nurse . . . {He raises his head, broods, peers again at 
ledger, reads) . . . Hm . . . Memorable . . . what? {He peers 
closer.) Equinox, memorable equinox. {He raises his head, stares 
blankly front. Puzzled.) Memorable equinox?'^^ 
Hearing the sounds of his voice describing these past feelings and events does 
little to jog his failing memory. The word "viduity" that he used in reference to his 
mother and that is repeated on the recording year after year, through time has 
become somehow "different" and is now as foreign to him as if it had been in 
another language: 
. . . there is of course the house on the canal where mother lay a-
dying, in the late autumn, after her long viduity (KRAPP gives a 
start) and the—(KRAPP switches off winds back tape a little, 
bends his ear closer to machine, switches on)—a-dying, after 
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Yet, even while he is able to fmd the definition of "viduity" in a text, and thus 
seems to have found the means with which to regain a past present, in the end the 
dictionary—because it offers too many possibilities—is just as incapable of 
recovering the present as the recorded voice had been: 
{Pause. He peers again at dictionary. Reading.) Deep weeds of 
viduity Also of an animal, especially a bird . . . the vidua or 
weaver-bird . . . Black plumage of male . . . {He looks up. With 
re/wA.) The vidua-bird!^^ 
To reinforce the proximity of writing and speech, Beckett shows how similar 
the recorded voice is to the written text of the ledger. He treats the spoken, recorded 
word as if it were as transcribed on paper; material, manipulatable, and subject to 
the breaks in the flow of meaning involved in reading. For example, when Krapp 
stops in the middle of a word to turn the page of his ledger he obscures the 
signification of what is being read in the process. With his "Adieu à l'a . . . {i\ 
tourne la page) . . . mour" meaning hangs precariously, if only for an instant, 
between "goodbye to . . . death," on one hand, and "goodbye to . . . love," on the 
othen These breaks in the flow of discourse that are a fact of the very material act 
of reading are paralleled by the ceaseless hesitations in the spoken discourse captured 
on the tape recording: "The face she had! The eyes! Like . . . {hesitates) . . . 
chrysolite! {Pause.) Ah well . . . {Pause.)"^^ This, coupled with the maniacally 
obsessive rewinding and fast-forwarding of the tape also allows Krapp to manipulate 
the spoken discourse in much the same way as he controls the flow, and thus the 
meaning, of the written discourse by tuming the pages of his book. 
Sharing many of the qualities traditionally assigned to writing, speech can no 
longer lay claim to being the bearer of presence; at least no more so than writing. 
This is particularly so in a play like La Dernière bande in which there is no pure 
her long viduity, and the—(KEAPP switches off, raises his head, 
stares blankly before him. His lips move in the syllables of 
viduity'. No sound.. .).^^ 
The only way he is able to regain at least the semblance of what the younger Krapp 
once meant by "viduity" is by referring to a text: 
(. .. He gets up, goes backstage into darkness, comes back with 
an enormous dictionary, lays it on the table, sits down and looks 
up the word.) KRAPP: {Reading from dictionary.) State—or 
condition—of being—or remaining—a widow—or widower 
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present to speak of But even those plays that appear to stage sheer presence reveal 
with time and with close attention to detail that there is no presence—^whether in 
the form of the body on stage or the spoken word—that is not already tainted in 
advance by time, consciousness, and mediation. Beckett's supposed tum to the 
theatre is not indicative of a belief in and desire for a pure presence. Instead, Beckett 
anticipates what philosophers like Jacques Derrida will later theorize as the 
unsettling of the speech/writing hierarchy and presents the reader with the very 
undecidabilty that lies at the heart of all binary oppositions. Indeed, Samuel Beckett's 
dramatic texts stage presence, but ultimately it is to expose the notions of presence 
of being and present time as little more than theoretical impossibilities. 
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